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1. Introduction 
Migration studies traditionally focus on t wo ideal types: countries of origin and destination. But 
immigration and emigration are two sides of the same coin. All the States in the world are both 
immigration and emigration countries. However, it is striking how they choose to be defined in a 
specific way, and why they prefer to build policies in accordance with that chosen image. European 
Union member states seem to fall into this self-image trap as well. However the sheer numbers cast 
some doubt on t he choice of “countries of destination” discourse. With net migration of 1.7‰ 
(compared e.g. with Canada of 5.6‰) the European Union is also an area of emigration.  
EU migration governance has so far neglected emigration, focusing solely on i mmigration 
management. Accessions in 2004 and 2007 of  predominantly emigration countries acerbated EU 
emigration dilemma, but they did not change the overall EU policy course. On the contrary, countries 
like Poland started paying even less attention to their emigrants (c. 4% of the population) and focused 
instead on its immigrants (less than 0.2%). Prioritizing immigration policies targeting scarce migration 
population has been the palpable effect of Europeanization (Weinar 2006). However, the EU-15 has 
not been emigration-free either: UK, Germany and France are at the top of European source countries 
in the US, Australia and Canada (see Tab. 1). 
Tab. 1 Permanent and temporary migration to the USA, Australia and Canada from the EU,  
in 2011. 
 USA Australia Canada 
Germany 26,526 3,092 10,917 
France 17,404 2,741 26,712 
UK 26,014 34,830 18,294 
EU-27 130,688 56,596 81,067 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ESSQR June 2012 and Canada Facts and Figures 2011.The reported figures do 
not capture flows of EU visitors for fewer than 90 days who do not need a visa, but who may work illegally at destination, 
nor does it capture dual nationals. 
The crisis of 2008, and subsequent (if relatively modest) rise in outflows from Southern European 
countries and Ireland, put emigration on the front pages of newspapers. However, it has failed to 
revive interest in building an EU response to emigration. Clearly, emigration is hardly an EU-level 
affair. It has not been mentioned in the Treaties, it is absent from EU legislation and even policy work. 
EU debates emigration and diaspora only in the context of development aid for third countries (Weinar 
2011). Regardless this clear agenda towards partner countries, migration and the development agenda 
has not made it to the forefront of the EU’s internal strategy and the EU’s comprehensive migration 
policy is silent on outflows from the EU. And yet, it is important for the EU Member States to be more 
proactive on emigration and diaspora policies in the context of the economic crisis while the future 
economic development of the Union. Emigration is an important phenomenon for various reasons: it 
influences demographics of the continent, as the mostly young leave or circulate whileit may be the 
retired who return; it impacts its socio-economic development – negatively through brain drain, but 
also positively through brain gain and capital flows; and it is also a way for the EU to become a global 
player through its mobile citizens.  
The lack of policy interest in emigration (or rather its development in the shadow of immigration 
policies) results in a c learly one-sided notion of European migration governance, which focuses 
entirely on immigration. I believe such a view to be too narrow and responsible for limiting research 
options. After all, emigration from the EU brings about interesting questions: how much of the EU is 
there outside of the EU? Does emigration enhance the European identity? On another note, emigration 
can plausibly influence the size and quality of immigration, but the interplay between the two is 
understudied in Europe. 
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It is not only important to study emigration – it is also important to study it for the various levels of 
European governance. It is true that migration policies have been traditionally a domain of the nation 
State, but the experience of immigration policy in the EU has shown that interconnected states have to 
cooperate and align their policies in this field to assure a proper functioning of the common market. 
The Member States clearly gained from exchanging policy experience and best practice. Therefore, 
immigration has become a matter for EU-level politics and policies. Logically, emigration policies 
should share this fate, as they belong to the migration continuum. Most importantly, there is a clear 
indication of the EU-level relevance of emigration. After all, the Treaties clearly establish a notion of 
EU citizenship outside the EU: as regards consular protection and voting rights (EU elections). The 
latter has been the subject of ongoing political struggles to give all EU nationals an equal chance to 
vote outside the EU, as not all Member States allow extra-territorial voting. The issue of the equality 
of EU nationals outside the EU can be further explored. Is there legal scope, for example, to extend the 
rights negotiated by one Member State for its citizens in a third country to all EU nationals?  
The aim of the paper is straightforward. I would like to prioritise the missing side of European 
migration governance, that is its approach to emigration and diaspora. In order to fill the research gap 
and to start building a coherent knowledge base on emigration and diaspora policies in the EU, I 
propose the mapping of the national responses to emigration over the last four years (mostly 
overlapping with the economic crisis and post-accession mobility). In this context there are two main 
questions that I will attempt to tackle: 
− First, what do we know about emigration from the EU – who migrates and to where? 
− Second, what are the main categories of response of the EU Member States to emigration? In 
other words, how can we categorize the existing European emigration and diaspora policies? 
The paper is constructed as follows. First, I introduce the debate on e migration and diaspora 
policies and highlight its relevance for the EU Member States. Second, I present empirical analysis 
(mapping) based on 28 country reports on emigration and diaspora policies in the EU Member States 
in the economic crisis (2010-2012). I will attempt to differentiate here between the policies addressing 
intra-EU emigration and those focusing on extra-EU flows in case I find a difference between the two. 
Third, I offer preliminary conclusions and debate possible further research directions. Throughout the 
paper I look mostly at extra-EU emigration and mobility (as opposed to intra-EU mobility), though 
these two categories are not necessarily separated out in the policies. 
The paper is based on commissioned reports written by 28 EU country correspondents provided in 
the framework of the project Carim East. Originally these reports were commissioned to provide an 
overview of emigration and diaspora policies in the EU member States and they were to be shared 
with the Eastern Partnership partners. The reports answered a few straightforward questions about the 
character of emigration flows and relevant policies in place (for the full list of reports see references). 
In addition I also include here the results of the field work I did in Canada in the summer of 2013, 
during which I conducted eight expert interviews in Ottawa and Montreal.  
2. What are emigration and diaspora policies? 
2.1 Emigration policy 
Since the end of the WWII, Western liberal democracies have developed immigration policies, 
focusing on regulating of the entry. This was in a clear contrast to the long-standing historical 
tradition: regulation of exit was the first migration policy in the history, practiced over centuries in all 
the states that were developed enough to assure administrative control of its subjects (Torpey 2003, 
Mau et al. 2012). In 1928 the general sense was that:  
…emigration is in fact a question of internal legislation of various states… The Law of Nations 
does not guarantee and cannot guarantee the right to emigration for each individual, even if it is 
Emigration policies in contemporary Europe 
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often stated that emigration from one’s country is a natural right of each individual (Lord McNair, 
in Oppenheim’s International Law, quoted by Dowty 1989: 82). 
Thus the building block of international law as we know it today, assuming the right of everybody 
to leave his/her country, is a new concept. Historically, the state answer to mobility of citizens was 
based on a perception of an individual as a capital belonging to a given socio-political and socio-
economic system. An individual was the basic element of the systems of production, of taxation, and 
of culture. This vision lay behind, for example, the indenture policies binding peasants to the land. 
Emigration was seen as a loss, especially in situations when a state (or another administrative unit) 
needed more of human capital, e.g. during wars or industrialisation period (Zolberg 1989). In Europe, 
for centuries then, outward mobility of vast parts of the population was restricted. The law was, of 
course, related to the availability of people: the population boom of 1800s in Europe relaxed outward 
mobility policies but did not bring them to an end. On the contrary, they became more sophisticated 
and even if mobility was easier, it was still regulated, especially in the late period of colonialism and 
transatlantic migrations (Mau et al. 2012). 
The change came after the shock of the two World Wars and related massive population 
movements. But only with the appearance of a totalitarian block of communist states which restricted 
the outflow of citizens did the right to leave one’s country become a fundamental human right. At the 
international level it became a politicized measure that has been used to indicate the level of liberalism 
and democracy in a given state.1
On the world stage emigration policy studies developed over the years in two main directions: 1) 
criticism of emigration policy seen as a prerogative of a t otalitarian state; and 2) emigration policy 
seen as an economic policy of developing states. In both cases the concepts of “brain drain” and 
“human capital” seemed to be crucial. 
 This view had an important consequence on the policies and 
scholarship of emigration in the Western tradition: if a liberal democracy could no longer regulate or 
control outflow, emigration lost its allure and was not a focus for scholarship. Diminishing numbers 
only strengthened this trend. Therefore, the issue of emigration from Northern European countries has 
rarely been discussed by Western scholars, while emigration from Southern European countries has 
been analyzed more but this stream of literature weakened over time substantially, even if the outflows 
continued (cfr. Russell 1986, Weiner 1995).  
The first field of scholarly investigation presents a wide range of historiographic analysis. Dowty 
(1989) in his seminal Closed Borders analyzed systematically two processes used by totalitarian states 
to regulate the flows of its own citizens: restrictions of exit and forced emigration. Analysis seems to 
prove that egalitarian regimes (or systems) tend to restrict exit more than right-wing regimes.2
Right-wing regimes, which did not underline the primacy of the community, focused more on 
forced emigration. For example, the Fascist regime in Italy even encouraged emigration of educated 
citizens as good for the image of the country (the emigration of other groups was not seen as 
positively) (Oblath 1931). Hitler’s Germany forced unwanted minorities to leave and did not consider 
 Left-
wing regimes (e.g. communist regimes) saw emigration as a b etrayal of ideology, escape from a 
common project realized by a community and an individualistic choice. Moreover, the arguments used 
were generally economic: in the communist era the authorities argued that they did not want people 
educated at the expense of the society (community) to profit other countries and societies. The 
promoted image of emigration as a dangerous and painful experience only added arguments for a strict 
control on exits. Interestingly enough, in European communist states emigration was banned only in 
Albania and Romania (until 1989). However, in other countries exit control was implemented 
bureaucratically , for example, through difficult passport procedures (Stola 1989). 
                                                     
1
 Conveniently enough, there is no matching right to enter another country freely, distorting mobility rights around the globe. 
2
 The ideology of community still transcends emigration and diaspora policy choices in countries with a strong welfare state 
ideology like Netherlands and Denmark (see section 3.3) 
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the emigration of ethnic Germans to be an issue(Dowty 1989). Forced emigration was usually 
achieved through indirect actions (administrative difficulties, limits to rights) and when it did not 
succeed then states resorted to deportations (Kłoczowski et al. 2000).  
Sometimes emigration could be used to achieve other political or economic aims. For example, in 
1975 communist Poland agreed to facilitate the emigration of ethnic Germans in exchange for 
financial help and for the re-establishment of normal relations with West Germany (Matelski 1999). 
The use of emigration in foreign policy has recently been analyzed by Greenhill (Greenhill 2011). In 
her studies on international conflicts she enumerated fifteen cases of “refugee blackmailing” used by 
weaker states towards the Western liberal democracies. The blackmailing usually aims at getting 
specific requests met (e.g. economic help, as between the US and Haiti in the 1994) and uses the 
syndrome of “hypocrysy cost” – i.e. the fear of the potential receiving countries of massive inflows of 
refugees, seen as people that cannot be returned. 
The second view on emigration policy has been developed in the area of development studies and 
focuses on the impact of brain-drain on development prospects of low-income countries. In the 1960s 
and 1970s the Marxist-based theories treated brain-drain in the context of the centre-periphery debate 
(Adams and Rieben 1968). Scholars explained the phenomenon either through push factors (Glaser 
1978), which include failed socio-economic development, or pull factors (Bhagwati 1984) which 
include “migration opportunity”. Adams and Rieben (1968) defined two main approaches to brain 
drain: cosmopolitan and nationalist. The first subscribes to the globalisation theories and center-
periphery divide. The “nationalist” view, anchored in Marxist tradition, perceives human capital as a 
limited resource. The emigration of educated individuals lowers this capital and puts at risk the future 
socio-economic development of the country. In the cosmopolitan view, human capital flows in this 
perspective are seen as something positive, giving more push to world production systems: 
An Indian statistician with a PhD working as a professor at an American university will contribute 
more to the global production than if he were to stay in his home country as a lower-rank state 
official; thus there is no profit in putting obstacles to migration of specialists.  
(Adams/Rieben 1968: 7).  
These debates ushered in two different policy approaches to emigration. The first one, represented 
by highly-developed countries, focused on the development of the countries of origin to prevent brain 
drain through the attenuation of push factors; and second, represented by developing countries, which 
put the responsibility for emigration and thus the failure to develop on pull factors, including brain-
gain policies (Zahlan 1981). According to this approach emigration policy seems to be more about the 
encouragement of stay and return (retention policies) rather than controlling outflows in a strict sense.  
Interestingly scholars from highly-developed countries did not focus at all on the same questions in 
relation to their own societies. Rather, they engaged in the debate in the context of low-income 
countries. In this way emigration policy became a thing for less fortunate states and started being 
associated with social, political and economic failure. At the opposite end, immigration policy has 
become the prerogative of wealthy and successful states.  
However, emigration policy has not been restricted to totalitarian regimes and low-income 
countries. As showed in the literature, middle-income countries, on a different level of development, 
have also been influenced the flows of their citizens. A state can play out its interests through 
emigration (Heisler 1985). Emigration policy understood in this way has two main elements: bilateral 
agreements on m obility of workers and diaspora engagement strategies. Bilateral agreements on 
contractual work have become quite popular in the contemporary world (Agunias 2006). Through 
them a co untry can ease any tensions on t he domestic labour market. The temporary migration of 
workers is seen as a w ay of increasing human capital on their return (such approaches are quite 
commonly defined in the policies of Central European states). Moreover, the taxes on their wages 
contribute to the wealth of the sending country.  
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2.2. Diaspora policy 
Diaspora policy is another area of state action towards a country’s own emigrants. The definition seems 
nowadays quite obvious, although when discussing the issue one has to be aware of the perpetual 
problems with defining “diaspora” (Cohen 1996, Schnapper and Davis 1999, Tololyan 1996).  
Why would a state engage in diaspora policies? Scholars gave basically two answers to this 
question. First, from a more political science point of view, a strongly linked diaspora can be used by 
the country of origin to influence the institutions of the country of destination. Good relations with ac 
ountry’s own diaspora can bring measurable political results: e.g. the influence of national ethnic 
groups on the US Congress (Gendt and Garcia 1977, King 2000, Miller and Martin 1982). The strong 
cultural and political identification of emigrant communities can thus bear palpable fruit as regards the 
survival (or otherwise) of a current political system at home.  
However, a more important issue today is diaspora engagement for development. The policy 
mantra has been reshaped by academics who have studied the linkages between various policy 
initiatives in various perspectives (de Haas 2005, van hear, Pieke and Vertovec 2004). The benefits of 
keeping links with emigrants and their descendants has been appraised as a way of keeping access to a 
broader human capital pool (Agunias and Newland 2007), additional foreign income in the form of 
remittances (Ratha 2005) and possible investments (Delano 2009). Sadly, all analysis to date has 
focused on diaspora policies and development agenda for developing countries.  
Alan Gamlen (Gamlen 2006, G amlen 2008) has been one of the very few scholars who has 
attempted to categorize contemporary approaches to emigrant communities, including OECD 
countries. He distinguishes two “diaspora mechanisms”: the first aiming at diaspora (community) 
building and the second preoccupied with binding emigrants to the home country with the net of rights 
and obligations. In the first case the policies would include extraterritorial citizenship, dual citizenship 
and extended cultural rights for emigrants and their descendents. This policy has a more ideational 
dimension to it. In the second case emigrants are offered a wide range of socio-economic rights but 
also obligations (e.g. special tax laws, property laws, voting rights etc.). However, we increasingly see 
that some states choose yet another form of policy: support for integration in the receiving country. 
This is particularly true for the countries of the European Union (hence the concept of European 
citizenship and a wide range of associated mobility rights) but also other wealthier OECD states, 
where citizens emigrate to countries of similar economic standing. Interestingly enough these 
mechanisms have been not fully studied and have not been clearly conceptualized as diaspora policies. 
2.3. What about a definition of emigration and diaspora policies? 
The literature to date has thus been quite confused on t he definition of emigration and diaspora 
policies. While it seems obvious what immigration policy is, emigration policy represents an enigma 
today. Even if the scholars agree to a broad understanding for diaspora policies in the context of 
migration and development, they are less convinced about the exact meaning of emigration policies. 
Indeed, they often confound them with the now old view of exit controls. So how should we define the 
two policies in the specific context of the liberal developed states? Scholars approaching this question 
are faced with historical accounts of mobility control or contemporary migration and development 
discourse, neither fitting the reality of the states they want to study very well (cfr. Weiner 1995).  
I define emigration policies as all policies that facilitate or curb mobility (outward and return) 
across international borders: e.g. agreements on seasonal work or permanent recruitment, return 
policies, retention schemes, portability of rights and exit restrictions. By diaspora policies I mean not 
only traditional diaspora building policies, which establish a link with the individuals and 
communities abroad (i.e. cultural and educational outreach), I also refer to diaspora engagement 
policies.Diaspora engagement policies, of course, provide emigrants and diaspora members with a set 
of rights and obligations through citizenship policies, such as voting rights, giving them tools for 
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better socio-economic integration in the country of origin or destination (such as taxation schemes, 
portability of rights and recognition of qualifications).  
Considering that economic and political interest shape emigration policy development today, I will 
look at the main elements of the modern form of emigration and diaspora policies that are present in all 
28 EU member states. These are inter alia: the facilitation of cross-border legal mobility and legal 
employment of own citizens; measures curbing brain drain, e.g. retention schemes; arrangements curbing 
brain waste, e.g. recognition of qualifications; return policy/brain gain policies; support for financial 
gains, e.g. targeted fiscal policy, portability of social rights; and cultural policies (active promotion of 
national and cultural identity of home country among migrants and ethnic communities abroad).  
3. Outward migration and mobility in the EU 
In this section I will present the results of the inquiry into the characteristics of emigration from 28 EU 
Member States.  
 
The questions we asked in the reports for this section were: 
- What are the main countries of destination for permanent and temporary emigrants (top 5 in 
2011, or if the data is available - 2012). Give only the list of countries and respective numbers. 
Explain shortly if there is any problem with the data. 
- Where possible, provide references to recent academic or non-academic publications on 
emigration from your country (up to 10). 
 
There is a clear research gap on emigration in the EU. Since 2006, only nine Member States have 
invested in research on the topic. These include usual suspects as Poland and Latvia, but also: UK 
(Finch et al. 2010) and the Netherlands. Unfortunately the studies tend to have a very narrow scope: 
they focus on the migration of highly-skilled professionals, researchers, and youth. The thematic 
choice (followed by targeted funding) brings to light the policy interests of the EU governments 
reflecting “nationalist” perspectives, such as are usually assumed by developing countries. They do 
not necessarily give a full picture of emigration and/or mobility (on all skill levels). 
The eternal problem of measuring emigration in the EU (as elsewhere) is twofold. First, it is rather 
impossible to accurately measure emigration flows at source, thus national data are rarely reliable in this 
regard. For example, it seems that in the EU only the Netherlands has an efficient administrative way of 
making its nationals de-register when they leave the country. In all other cases de-registration, although 
required, is not enforced, and the absence of a national can be spotted by chance and then introduced into 
the registry (as happens, for instance, in Belgium). In the countries with substantial emigration flows, 
like Poland, de-registration is not required. The insistence on de-registration seems to be linked to the 
country’s attitude towards emigrants: in the countries experiencing high levels of emigration such as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Poland there is the fact of being registered in the home country, instead. The 
actual numbers of emigrants are estimated through the Labour Force Surveys, instead. 
Measurement at destination are more reliable. However in the case of vast majority of EU nationals 
the flows under three months can be also difficult to capture as they are pretty much exempt from visa 
obligation in many countries of the world. Moreover, mobile EU nationals who go towards other 
OECD countries can also be dual nationals (or foreign born), impossible to capture at destination 
(although the numbers might be small).  
Emigration policies in contemporary Europe 
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Many national statistical offices use national definitions of emigrants and gather information about 
stocks instead. In this way the comparability of the information among 28 Member States on 
emigration is rather difficult, as the concepts of “national” differ according to the relevant traditions 
and citizenship laws. Consider Poland, where being Polish abroad is defined according to nationality 
at birth (transferable up to four generations); and the Netherlands, where last year proposals to take 
away the nationality from first generation emigrants, if they stay abroad for too long, led to an outcry. 
In some countries the consular registries are used as a proxy of stocks (e.g. France). Moreover, the 
Eurostat data on emigration are scarce and patchy as many Member States simply do not communicate 
them. In addition, flows and even stock of EU nationals moving/staying in another EU Member State 
are also almost impossible to measure, as intra-EU mobility does not require strict administrative 
procedures: and even when it does these procedures are not necessarily fulfilled. The proxies used by 
scholars produce different results (see e.g. Table 4 below). In this paper I do not attempt to tackle 
these problems as they would need extensive quantitative work. Moreover, many of the problems of 
measurement are contained through OECD cooperation on m igration data between sending and 
receiving countries.3
The European Union is a very special case of regional economic integration which enhances the 
mobility of people well beyond the flows of migrant workers. As there are not so many obstacles to 
these flows, most EU nationals migrate to another EU Member State. Among the five main 
destinations for EU migrants, EU destinations are predominant, but non-EU destinations are firmly 
present in the first five top destinations in the case of 25 out of 28 Member States.  
 I present the nationally-defined emigration destinations, while being aware that 
they are not comparable.  
Tab. 2 Five top destinations for emigration from the EU Member States  
(national sources, 2012, stock data) 
 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK 
EU, Serbia, 
Turkey 
EU, USA 
Turkey, 
USA, EU 
EU, USA, 
Canada, 
Emirates 
EU 
EU, USA, 
Switzerland 
EU, USA, 
Norway 
EE EL ES FI FR HR HU 
EU, Russia 
EU, USA, 
Canada, 
Australia 
(Turkey, 
Russia, Arab 
Emirates) 
EU, 
Argentina, 
Venezuela, 
Ecuador, US 
EU, USA 
EU, 
USA, 
Canada 
EU, US, BiH, 
Serbia, 
Montenegro 
EU, USA, 
Canada 
IR IT LT LU LV MT NL 
UK, 
Canada, 
Australia, 
USA, New 
Zealand 
EU, 
Argentina, 
Brazil 
EU, USA EU 
EU, 
USA, 
Russia 
EU, UK, 
Canada, 
Australia, 
USA, New 
Zealand 
EU, 
Canada, 
Australia, 
USA, New 
Zealand 
PL PT RO SI SK SE UK 
EU, USA EU, Angola 
EU, USA, 
Canada 
EU, AU, 
USA 
EU EU, USA 
EU, USA; 
Australia, 
Canada 
Source: EU country reports 
 
                                                     
3
 http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/keystat.htm  
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The quantitative information is taken from different sources in different countries, making 
comparison impossible. Below I present two cases of different measurement approaches. 
Tab. 3 Emigration from Germany, 2012 
Germany (Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, population register) 
Top 5 destinations in 2012 of all 
emigrants (711 992): 
Top 5 destinations in 2012 of German 
nationals (133 233): 
Poland (114 425) Switzerland (20 826) 
Romania (71 152) USA (12 803) 
Bulgaria (33 741) Austria (11 022) 
Turkey (32 788) UK (7 802) 
USA (29 543) France (6 245) 
Tab. 4 Emigration from France, 2012 
France 
Top 5 non-EU countries Number of French citizens registered abroad in 2012 
MFE (Maison des 
Français de l’Etranger) 
estimate for 2012 
United States  125 171  200.000  
Canada  78 647  150 000  
Israel 72 548  no data available  
Morocco  45 269  no data available  
China  30 787  no data available  
   
Top 5 countries in general 
Switzerland  158 862  160 000  
United Kingdom  126 049  250 000  
United States  125 171  200 000  
Belgium  113 563  163 000  
Germany  110 881  190 000  
Regardless of its shortcomings, the above table gives some interesting insights concerning not only 
the destinations but also the categories of migrants. There are basically four categories of emigrants 
from the EU (permanent and temporary) captured in the current statistics of the Member States.  
The first category are Member State nationals with no immigrant background. For them the 
statistics show a high return rate (especially for the UK, France and Denmark) and more propensity to 
circulate and to be mobile. Settlement/long-term migration outside of the EU is less popular among 
this group. This is the group that comes immediately to one’s mind when speaking about emigration 
from the EU. But in fact, it is not the main source of outflows. 
The second category are EU nationals with an immigrant background. This group is extremely 
difficult to capture in administrative statistics both at origin (for the reasons enumerated above) and 
destination: these people can be holders of dual citizenship and thus their mobility is not counted, or 
they are just registered as EU nationals. The phenomenon of the emigration of EU nationals of 
immigrant origin both to their ancestral countries and to other OECD countries (e.g. highly-skilled 
French-Algerians to Canada) has not yet been studied in-depth. However this particular group seems 
to be a very interesting case for understanding the interplay between EU emigration and immigration 
Emigration policies in contemporary Europe 
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policies. The perceived failure of integration policies in the EU seems to be an important driver of this 
emigration (see e.g. Balci and Michielsen 2013 on Turkish-Belgian youth return migration to Turkey).  
The third group of emigrants are non-EU nationals. They constitute a very high percentage among 
emigrants from EU-15. In the case of Austria it is around 70% of the outflow; Denmark, Germany – 
80%; Spain, France, and the Netherlands – ca. 65%. It is difficult to assess how many of them are 
actually temporary migrants, whose residence permit expired and how many are long-term residents. 
However, as can be deduced from the Table 2 a nd 3, most of these outflows are return migration 
flows. It must be noted here that some Member States (notably Denmark) have introduced 
return/emigration incentives for the communes hosting big numbers of long-term residents, thus 
enhancing outflows of this group of migrants. 
The fourth group are EU nationals of national minorities. This is a very special case of emigrants 
originating mainly from the EU-13. There are two categories of migrants in this group. The first 
category are those who are actively encouraged to emigrate, as this is the case with Russian-speaking 
minorities in the Baltic states, and especially Estonia. The socio-political situation of this group is 
quite difficult (e.g. problems with citizen rights, fragile legal status and, linked to this, failed socio-
economic integration). The same patterns can be seen now in Croatia with its Serbian minority. The 
second category are those members of minorities, who emigrate for better economic opportunities 
abroad (and in addition can experience discrimination in the home country). This is the case with 
Bulgarian Turks and Greek Turkish minority choosing emigration to Turkey, but also to Russian-
speaking minority in Latvia emigrating to Russia.  
The studies of emigration flows from the EU rarely distinguish between these four categories. 
Actually, in the common perception the concept of an EU emigrant seems to be limited to the first 
category. However, in the past 10 years, diaspora and emigration policies of some Member States 
developed taking into account the second category of emigrants as well.  
4. Emigration and diaspora policies in contemporary European Union. 
 
The questions we asked in the reports for this section were 
• Is there a state emigration policy? (e.g. bilateral agreements to send workers abroad). What 
institution is responsible for it? 
• Is there a state diaspora policy? (e.g. focusing on return migration, on circular return 
migration, on keeping economic links). What institution is responsible for it? 
• Is multiple citizenship allowed or tolerated? 
• Are there bilateral agreements on double taxation and portability of social rights? 
• Are there national language schools in the top 5 countries of destination?  
• What are the prevailing discourses on emigration? Is it an issue on political agenda? 
Regardless of the mainstream rhetoric, all EU Member States have some sort of a strategy towards 
emigrants, be emigration temporary or permanent. The policies are determined by the history of 
emigration, the characteristics of contemporary outflows and by self-image as a co untry of 
immigration or emigration. Many EU Member states have active strategies on emigration, and several 
updated their policies in the last couple of years. 
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Tab. 5 Overview of existing institutions, laws and strategies addressing emigration in the EU. 
AT BE BG CY HR CZ DE 
No (MFA 
services) 
no 
yes, post-
1989 the Law 
for 
Bulgarians 
and the 
Bulgarian 
communities 
abroad; 
the State 
Agency for 
the 
Bulgarians 
Abroad 
no 
2011 the 
Strategy 
for the 
relations 
between 
the 
Republic of 
Croatia and 
the 
Croatians 
outside the 
Republic of 
Croatia 
1990, the 
Strategy to 
enhance 
relations 
with Czech 
compatriots 
abroad 
yes, 1979 
German 
Emigrant 
Protection 
Act 
(amended 
2012) 
DK EE EL ES FI FR HU 
no  
2009 
diaspora 
engagemen
t strategy 
no data 
yes, Ley 
40/2006, 
del 
Estatuto de 
la 
ciudadanía 
española en 
el exterior 
Programme 
for 
Expatriate 
Finns 2006. 
since early 
20th 
century; 
Maison des 
Français de 
l’Etranger 
No (only 
minorities) 
IR IT LT LU LV MT NL 
Since 2002 
ad-hoc 
economic 
engagemen
t strategies 
and return 
policies 
since 
1950s, at 
state and 
regional 
level 
2007 
Strategy on 
Emigration; 
Global 
Lithuania 
programme 
no 
yes, since 
1990s; the 
Ambassado
r-at-Large 
for 
diaspora 
MFA; 
2011 
Image of 
Latvia and 
links with 
fellow 
Latvians 
abroa 
Directorate 
for Maltese 
Living 
Abroad 
no 
PL PT RO SI SK SE UK 
2008 
(amended 
in 2012) 
Migration 
Policy of 
Poland – 
Current 
State of 
Play and 
Further 
Actions;  
2010 
Valorizar 
as 
Comunidad
es 
Portuguesas 
Law 156/ 
2000 on the 
Protection of 
Romanian 
Citizens 
Working 
Abroad 
since 2010 
Strategy 
for 
economic 
migration 
for the 
period 
from 2010 
to 2020 
includes 
some clues 
on 
emigration 
Concept 
for the 
State 
Policy 
Until 2015 
for Care of 
Slovaks 
Living 
Abroad 
no 
no, but 
increased 
interest since 
2006 
Source: country reports 
Emigration policies in contemporary Europe 
CARIM-East RR 2014/01 © 2014 EUI, RSCAS 11 
The short overview provides several interesting insights. In 2000s there have been a general 
increased interest in emigration and diaspora policies: nine out of 28 MS have introduced a new 
dedicated Law (recent or recently amended) or a Strategy (BG, DE, ES, HR, LT, PL, RO, SI, SK) on 
the topic. six out of 28 include emigration in their Migration Policy Strategies (BG, EE, FI, HR, PL, 
SI), linking effects of emigration to possible attenuation through immigration. eighteen out of 28 
propose return migration policies (both of ethnic emigrants and of ethnic minorities) seen as a 
response to demographic crisis and as an economic asset. Only four out of 28 Member States focus 
explicitly on the issue of return or the retention of youth (LT, MT, SI, SK). 
The mapping of EU responses to emigration on national level reveals three main categories of 
actions: traditional diaspora building policies; diaspora engagement policies; and active 
emigration policies. 
4.1 Traditional diaspora building policies 
25 out of 28 Member States engage actively in diaspora building policies. The focus is on catering for 
the cultural needs of the communities of the same cultural background abroad, such as language 
schools, national curricula schools or active cultural programs for diaspora. Only Austria4
Among the countries with cultural outreach policies, we encounter cooperation along linguistic and 
cultural lines. For example, Greek Cypriot government cooperates with Greek government as regards 
language and national curriculum schools abroad. Also the Greek Orthodox church caters for the 
needs of Greek Cypriot communities abroad. Austrian communities fill in the state policy vacuum by 
cooperating with German institutions abroad, especially as regards schools. The same can be said 
about Belgian associations: divided along linguistic lines, they tend to cooperate with French, Dutch or 
German entities. 
, Denmark 
and Luxembourg have no government strategy, nor program focusing on e migrants and the 
cultural/linguistic support for them. The cultural links are built rather by private institutions and non-
governmental organizations, for example, Lutheran churches serving Danish communities abroad. 
The most common element of cultural policy is maintenance of language and curricula schools 
abroad. Often they are affiliated at embassies (as Sunday or weekend schools), but also as self-
standing curriculum programs. There is a difference in approach. Central European Member States 
maintain embassy schools (Bulgaria has over 350!), as well as curricula for national minorities abroad 
(e.g. Lithuanian school programs in Poland). The Northern Member States tend to mix cultural 
diplomacy with diaspora outreach: the prime example is the network of French5
The Member States also engage in building identity of certain professional groups abroad, 
although the practice is not very common (four out of 28 Member States): e.g. the Czech Republic 
creates Czech Business Clubs in the main countries of destination, while the Irish state supports 
various Irish professional organizations abroad (the extreme example of that was the 2009 Irish 
Global Economic Forum).  
 or British schools 
abroad offering full curricula. Germany is the most active state in this field, offering over 870 
language and cultural programs in local schools abroad. 
In general, the Member States seem to uphold a tradition of providing cultural ties to their 
emigrants and their descendants. Not surprisingly, the more ethnic-based the dominant culture is at 
origin, the more intense the investment in these ties. Hence the difference between fewer than five 
schools offering cultural and language immersion offered by the Czech Republic abroad and nearly 
                                                     
4
 Even Austrian Institutes abroad focus only on teaching of German and offer a program of general Germanophone cultural 
events rather than specific Austrian cultural programs. 
5
 Until 2012, French schools abroad were free of charge for French citizens living abroad. 
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200 offered by Lithuania. The size of the country does not matter either: Malta supports twelve 
language and cultural programs in the main countries of destination, while Denmark supports none. 
A separate category of catering for diaspora needs are policies focusing on vulnerable emigrants. 
Such policies had been the center of Spanish and Portuguese diaspora policies up until the crisis. They 
addressed the needs of pensioners and emigrants in extreme poverty. Italy also runs a program for its 
retired diaspora abroad, that boils down to giving information on possibilities of getting the Italian 
pension rights and of a return to Italy for old age.  
4.2. Diaspora engagement policies 
Following the new trends in diaspora policies world-wide, we could expect that the EU Member States 
should have taken a deeper look at the outflows of human capital and that they might focus on engaging 
emigrants in development strategies. In fact, the debate about emigration of the youth and highly skilled 
that has taken place at the EU level since the beginning of the euro-zone crisis (and particularly on the 
emigration of researchers for over a decade now) is not new to many EU Member States. Nevertheless, 
approaches differ. They are mainly driven by dominant discourses in a given country. 
For countries with a strong global entrepreneurial outreach, like the UK and the Netherlands, the 
issue of emigration of human capital has risen higher on the political agenda in the last ten years. The 
UK is the top EU sending country to non-EU destinations and the Netherlands is also among the top 
ten sending EU states. This has to do with the economic engagement of British and Dutch companies 
in many countries around the world, but is also a question of specific categories of migrants: Dutch 
agrarian entrepreneurs tend to emigrate to places where they can invest in agricultural production, 
hence a growing Dutch community in Australia. In 2006, the UK authorities launched a research 
program “The Global Brit” in order to analyze the phenomenon of British emigration flows, focusing 
on the potential of emigration for strengthening British economic clout abroad. Conversely, the Dutch 
authorities were more interested in potential brain-drain from the Netherlands than in potential brain-
gain for the Dutch economy. The two views reflected the actual ideology around emigration: as the 
result of the imperial experience, the British traditionally see emigration as part and parcel of building 
global economic and political power. The communitarian tradition of the Netherlands is much more 
cautious towards emigration. 
France is an interesting case of a country which does not acknowledge emigration. In fact, the French 
policies use the term “expatrié” instead of “emigrant” and “international mobility” instead of 
“emigration”. Language here is telling: the links between France and its citizens abroad is stable and the 
distance only temporary. This perspective pushes French authorities to take more responsibility over 
those French men and women living abroad. Apart from the vast cultural and educational activities, 
France is a very good example of active diaspora engagement policy entrepreneur. French institutions 
actively link with French entrepreneurs abroad and French communities are well organized around a 
dense network of French schools and Institutes of Culture. As the French do not emigrate but are merely 
mobile, State policies provide this category of people with special social security services and special 
bank services. Moreover, international mobility being an occasion for brain-gain, France has a special 
view of the labour market integration of its citizens abroad. It is not by chance that France is party to the 
only successful (to the date) example of an ambitious bilateral agreement in the area of recognition of 
qualifications. The France-Quebec Memorandum of Understanding on R ecognition of Professional 
Qualifications of 2008 covers almost 100 professions, trades and functions and makes it almost 
automatically possible for France-educated workers to practice their occupational skills in Quebec. The 
Memorandum has been made possible in part thanks to linguistic and cultural affinity of the two 
educational systems, and it made part of the broader France’ support for “la francophonie”. Regardless 
however of official ideological discourses, the fact is that since 2008, 15 t imes more French nationals 
benefited from the Memorandum than Canadian ones. This fact makes the policy a very pragmatic move 
in the effort to keep the brain circulation and brain gain a fact. 
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The traditional emigration countries of the European Union have different approaches to diaspora 
engagement. There are basically the categories of countries we are looking at: countries that experienced 
increased emigration flows following the EU accession, like Poland and the Baltic States, and countries 
that experienced more intense emigration after the euro-zone crisis, like Portugal and Ireland. 
EU accession eased the tension on the labour market of Poland (a rather positive outcome) but 
caused damaging outflows from Latvia and Lithuania. Reaction to emigration has been thus different. 
In Poland, emigration has not been felt to be a national economic drama. The flows had been there 
before, after 2004 they merely changed the destination and main characteristics (e.g. more young 
people emigrated to get more legal jobs). The response of the government was driven as much by the 
political situation at home as by a sense of economic urgency. The strategy towards emigration is very 
limited. It was based on renegotiating tax and portability of social rights agreements with the main 
countries of destination. There is no active return policy, only limited attempts to offer information 
about return options. The lack of active diaspora engagement policy can be explained by legal 
constraints: the Polish Constitution does not allow a different set of socio-economic or political rights 
to citizens regardless of their place of residence. Thus policies that would favour emigrants e.g. 
investments by emigrants (such as 2+1 in Mexico) cannot be legally implemented.6
The Baltic States, on the contrary, presented ambitious strategies that focus on diaspora 
engagement. However, none of the policy documents have been implemented so far. 
 The same is true 
of return incentives.  
Among the eurozone crisis emigration countries, Ireland has been to the date the only one that has 
actually tried to engage the diaspora. Already between 2000 and 2002, Ireland ran the “Jobs Ireland 
Programme”, informing Irish emigrants and their descendants of the employment opportunities in 
Ireland (this was, of course, in the Celtic Tiger phase of Ireland development). The onset of the 
economic crisis in 2008/09 resulted in an extra state drive to involve the Irish diaspora in economic 
business and tourist activity in the country. This led to the establishment of the Global Irish Economic 
Forum in 2009. One of the proposals that came from the Forum was the establishment of a ‘Global 
Irish Network’, which today comprises over 350 of the most senior Irish and Irish connected business 
people based in almost 40 countries. Another idea that emanated from the forum was the creation of 
the “Gathering”, a tourist-led initiative that has attempted to generate money in the domestic economy 
by attracting people from the Irish diaspora to visit the country during 2013. One other (largely 
unsuccessful) example of the state’s attempts to generate money from the Irish diaspora came in 
September 2011, w hen the Department of Foreign Affairs launched the new Certificate of Irish 
Heritage (at the cost of 40 EUR).  
Among the instruments that can link the emigrants and diaspora to the country of origin are 
citizenship policies.  
                                                     
6
 Interview with member of the scientific council to the Prime Minister of Polish government, 25.06.2013 
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Tab. 6 Dual citizenship in the EU 
AT BE BG CY HR CZ DE 
dual 
citizneship 
not allowed 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed; 
voting 
allowed 
28 393 
certificates 
issued for 
Bulgarian 
origin in 
2012 for 
members of 
minorities 
(semi-
citizenship 
status) ; ius 
soli, dual 
citizenship 
allowed 
dual 
citizenshi
p allowed 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed, ius 
sanguinis; 
facilitated 
naturalisation 
for 
descendants 
ius 
sanguinis; 
automatic 
loss if 
naturalised; 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed for 
marriage, 
birth, 
restoration 
after 
deprivation 
(communist 
regime); 
semi-
citizenship 
 
 
dual 
citizenship 
partially 
allowed 
DK EE EL ES FI FR HU 
dual 
citizenship 
not allowed, 
but 
exception 
for birth. In 
2013 the 
concern for 
native 
Danish 
abroad 
pushed the 
government 
to reconsider 
the policy. 
 
 
dual 
citizenship 
not allowed 
dual 
citizenship 
permitted, 
indefinite 
transmission 
dual 
citizenshi
p allowed 
for some 
countries 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed 
IR IT LT LU LV MT NL 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed, ius 
sanguinis 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed, ius 
sanguinis 
ius 
sanguinis, 
dual not 
allowed;  
dual 
citizenshi
p allowed 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed for 
some countries 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed; ius 
sanguinis 
dual 
nationality 
hardly 
tolerated: 
proposal in 
2013: Dutch 
nationals who 
spend ten 
years 
(uninterrupted) 
outside of the 
Netherlands 
and the EU 
could lose 
their Dutch 
nationality. 
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PL PT RO SI SK SE UK 
ius 
sanguinis; 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed; 
semi-
citizenship 
for 
minorities 
dual 
citizenship 
not allowed 
but in 
practice it is 
tolerated 
dual 
citizenship 
is allowed 
ius 
sanguinis; 
dual 
tolerated;  
ius sanguinis; 
dual 
citizenship 
tolerated; 
marriage or 
birth cases 
allowed by 
law; fees to 
renounce 
citizenship 
multiple 
citizenship 
tolerated 
dual 
citizenship 
allowed; 
agreements 
that counteract 
forced loss 
Source: country reports 
EU Member States predominantly allow dual citizenship. When they do not, the policy has been 
conceived with regard to naturalized immigrants rather than country-born emigrants and their 
descendants, as in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands. 
4.3 Emigration policies 
The EU Member States shape the mobility of their citizens in two main ways: through actual 
agreements on mobility; through agreements facilitating this mobility, such as agreements on double 
taxation or social security agreements. 
Apart from EU freedom of movement, which is the best example of an emigration policy applied 
on a regional scale, all Member States have some form of mobility agreement as regards external EU 
movement. The most popular ones are Work and Travel agreements signed by almost all Member 
States with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as, to a lesser extent, with the US. Disguised 
as cultural programmes, these schemes are in fact temporary worker agreements.  
However, only few member States have non-EU agreements on sending workers abroad. In fact, 
this type of information is very difficult to get and for the moment we can only rely on a necdotal 
evidence. For example, in the special case of Canada, Germany has been regularly involved in sending 
abroad specific categories of workers, such as truck drivers of middle-skilled technicians, to work in 
Canadian provinces. The same is true of Poland, which has been regularly providing specialists in the 
“clean coal” technology for the province of Alberta. Portugal had had a rich internship programs for 
its IT specialists to go and work in the Silicon Valley companies (with rather low return rate). These 
agreements, however, are not well documented, as they are usually negotiated between the economic 
departments of the EU embassies and relevant authorities in the destination countries. The lack of 
information on this type of activity is further sustained by the lack of public interest (as opposed to 
immigrant recruitment agreements). It is thus possible that there are more bilateral agreements on the 
mobility of workers from the EU. 
As regards international agreements on double taxation and social security, EU Member States are 
very active. A brief look at the numbers of non-EU agreements on double taxation ( that is signed with 
non-EU countries, covered otherwise by EU legislation) shows that France signed only nine such 
agreements (defined as quite detailed) and the champion in this regard, Germany, as many as 74 (less 
heavy). As regards social security rights outside of the EU coordination mechanism, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia have not a single agreement with a non-EU country, while the 
champion here, the Netherlands, has 60. 
Until now, the EU Member States have not engaged en masse in return policies that would bear 
fruit on the same level with developing countries. But as noted in the first part of this section, some of 
them actually put these kinds of solutions in policy strategy documents. 
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5. Some conclusions 
• Migration governance is a term widely recognized in migration studies literature (Betts 2011, 
Kunz et al 2011) but it, in fact, only deals with immigration. However, the EU countries tend 
to address both in-flows and out-flows and their consequences. If the regulation of in-flows 
is regarded as “top-of-the agenda”, out-flows gain less attention, with the exception of the 
recent few years of euro-crisis. And yet there are several ways in which both types of 
mobility are related: immigration can be a response to emigration (to meet shortages on the 
labour market); failed integration can cause more emigration; highly mobile immigrants can 
move to other destinations, etc. Migration governance should thus work in a continuum of 
various forms of mobility and should be redefined.  
• The individual EU Member States have very well-grounded strategies and policies towards 
emigration. From the almost anti-emigration stance of Denmark and the Netherlands, to 
active and nurturing policies of Ireland, France and Germany. Following my division 
between diaspora policies (focusing on c reating ties and supporting performance of 
individuals and communities) and emigration policies (regulating mobility), we can see that 
basically all Member States are active in these areas. However, emigration policies are much 
more difficult to capture as they no longer involve mass recruitment or nation-wide 
regulations. They are also less publicized. 
• What is important the experiences of the Member States are not promoted on the EU-level. 
There is no EU community of practice that has emerged around the emigration issue (as 
opposed to the immigration issue).  
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